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Sloth: America’s Ironic Structural Vice
Christopher D. Jones and Conor M. Kelly

Individualism is a popular cultural trope in the United States, often touted for
its promotion of industriousness and rejection of laziness. This essay argues
that, ironically, America’s brand of individualism actually promotes a more
fundamental form of the very vice it purports to oppose. To make this case,
the essay defines the unique form of individualism in the United States and
then retrieves the classical definition of sloth as a vice against charity (not
diligence), contrasting Aquinas and Barth with Weber to demonstrate that this
peculiarly American individualist impulse undermines civic charity by reaping
the benefits of civic relationships while denying any concomitant responsibilities. Identifying this narrative of individualism as a structural vice, the essay
proposes structural remedies for reinvigorating civic charity, solidarity, and the
common good in the United States.

In the United States, laziness is a cardinal sin. Simply
consider contemporary political discourse, which castigates myriad forms of
laziness under the polemical label of dependency. Behind this indictment lies
an assumption about the inherent value of industriousness, suggesting that hard
work and personal dedication are the key to a successful life. In support of this
presupposition, American culture has been shaped by an individualist ethos
that characterizes each man or woman as master of his or her own fate. In theory, this rugged individualism creates social incentives for personal diligence,
thereby undermining the vice of sloth. In practice, however, the idealization
of this radically independent individual is actually a structural evil promoting
the more fundamental form of the vice it purports to oppose. To articulate
and defend this claim, we offer a three-part assessment. The first part outlines
a distinctive brand of individualism in the United States, establishing the fully
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autonomous individual as a consistent cultural trope with moral implications.
The second part explains how this ethos encourages sloth by distinguishing
sloth as a vice against Max Weber’s Protestant work ethic from its more classical formulation as a vice against charity. The third part describes how the
individualist ethos enshrines sloth as a structural vice that can be countered
with structural remedies to foster charity, solidarity, and the common good.
The result is a fuller account of the influential role our cultural categories play
in framing moral discourse and a clearer sense of how to mitigate some of the
most damaging effects so that we might reinvigorate civic life.

An Individualist Ethos
There is ample reason to assert that an individualist ethos shapes US culture,
especially when one conceives of individualism broadly as the cultural identification of the individual human person as the primary agent in social, political,
and economic life. This puts individualism in opposition to collectivism, which
would identify a collective social unit or units (e.g., the nuclear family) as the
principal agent in social, political, and economic life.1 At this general level,
studies routinely show that the United States is the most individualist-oriented
country on the planet, in contrast to much more collectivist-focused nations.2 It
is no surprise, then, that political scientist Seymour Lipset identified individualism as one of the five central elements of the “American Creed” that makes
the United States an exceptional (i.e., outlier) nation.3 Thus, a cultural ethos of
individualism holds a certain pride of place in the United States insofar as this
is not generally a collectivist nation. Such a description, while accurate, does
not fully capture the contours of the unique brand of individualism that holds
sway in the United States. To get a fuller picture of the specifics, one needs
to appreciate the foundations and evolution of America’s curious blending of
individualism and moral responsibility.
The case for a distinct form of individualism in the United States begins
with the Revolution. Admittedly, scholars debate the emergence of a uniquely
American individualism during this period. On one side, Lipset insists that
the Revolution gave birth to a political philosophy that prioritized individual
freedom and rejected external (i.e., governmental) limitations on that freedom;
on the other side, some historians contend that there were multiple forms of
individualism and even a few forms of collectivism informing colonial life in
the late eighteenth century.4 One of the strongest supporters of the latter interpretation is the political philosopher Michael Sandel, who argued in Democracy’s Discontent that the United States has essentially had two competing
versions of individualism: one aligned with republicanism and popular during
the revolutionary era, which defended the rights of the individual in order to
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encourage greater participation in the communal pursuit of the common good,
and another aligned with procedural liberalism and increasingly popular during
the twentieth century, which was more concerned with promoting individual
rights as freedoms from interference rather than as the basis for contributing
to civic life.5
Sandel’s account is compelling, especially because he acknowledges the presence and influence of both of these forms of individualism at the birth of the
United States.6 The historical record bears out his claim, as the political discourse of the founders regularly appealed to the republican ideal of individuals
free from external coercion precisely so that they could participate in collective
self-governance.7 Contemporary studies have uncovered a late colonial shift
toward the presumption of individuals as more inherently self-interested and
thus in need of the procedures of government chiefly to protect their personal
rights, a view that eventually influenced the development of the Constitution.8
Hence, it is appropriate to conceive of individualism in the United States as
one genus with two species, a republican species oriented to civic participation
and a liberal species oriented to personal freedom.
Tellingly, both of these brands of individualism offer a rational basis for
the promotion of industriousness, and thus each has a potential contribution
to make to the fight against sloth. The republican form suggests that personal
diligence is required to form citizens’ capacities for participation in shared selfgovernance. Indeed, proponents of republican individualism touted the importance of civic virtues, arguing that democratic engagement required moral
formation.9 Consequently, republican individualism touts industriousness at a
general level, with respect to one’s character development, for slothfulness in
this area of life would do damage to both the individual and the community.
Meanwhile, the liberal form of individualism critiques sloth and encourages
industriousness primarily for the sake of self-sufficiency. In this view, individual
autonomy is paramount, so a lack of industry is an inherent problem because
lazy individuals lose their autonomy and have no hope for their own success.10
These two species of individualism thus propose two distinct accounts of diligence and rejections of sloth. Although they are not mutually exclusive, they
are different and their differences track, to a degree, with the distinctions surrounding the vice of sloth discussed in the next section.
On its face, this parallel with the competing conceptions of sloth would
pose a problem for our argument, at the very least undermining our claim that
individualism in the United States combats one form of sloth while promoting
another. In truth, however, this would be a problem only if both versions of
individualism were equally prevalent in our nation’s cultural discourse. While
both species have in fact persisted over time, their respective influences have
seldom been the same. Indeed, the individualist ethos in the United States
has evolved to elevate the liberal version of individualism over its republican
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counterpart, to the point that only one version of sloth has been the target of
cultural critique.
Certainly, the seeds of liberal individualism’s success were present in the
revolutionary period. The Declaration of Independence, for instance, argues
for insurrection as a means of securing individual liberties. Although the document orients these personal rights to a common cause, the bearer of the rights
in question remains the individual in se. In addition, the document’s echoes
of John Locke and other social contract thinkers, which emerged during the
revisions of Jefferson’s original draft, introduce a more liberal notion of the
individual as inherently unencumbered by even social bonds.11 These seeds
quickly began to sprout, to the point that one of the earliest observers of the
fledgling democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, recorded the prevalence of a distinctively American individualism “that disposes each citizen to isolate himself
from the mass of his fellows and to withdraw to the side with his family and his
friends; so that, after thus creating a small society for his own use, he willingly
abandons the large society to itself.”12
In fairness, some contemporary scholars challenge the quick equation of
Tocqueville’s French term, individualisme, with the contemporary version of liberal individualism, arguing that he was in fact describing a rejection of national
solidarity in favor of links to the local community and not a wholesale renunciation of all social ties.13 This makes sense, especially in the American context,
where Tocqueville notes that free elections required aspirants to office to create
bonds with other citizens in order to succeed.14 Still, the critique is not as powerful as its proponents would suggest, for two reasons. First, liberal individualism
does not deny the existence of social ties, it merely redefines their origin. On this
point Tocqueville’s individualisme does reflect the shift from a more republican
form to individualism to a more liberal version because he indicates that American individualism creates voluntary ties “out of ambition” rather than natural
order.15 Second, even granting the critics’ claim that Tocqueville’s individualisme
is not identical to contemporary liberal individualism is not a problem, for his
descriptions still reveal a movement away from republican individualism, a point
that aligns with the narrative of historical evolution.
Tocqueville’s account of individualism in the early years of the United States
shows the emergence of a more independence-oriented cultural ethos. Tocque
ville explains that the United States’ democratic individualism created a class
of people who believe they “owe nothing to anyone, they expect nothing so
to speak from anyone; they are always accustomed to consider themselves in
isolation, and they readily imagine that their entire destiny is in their hands.”16
This vision of the individual certainly stands in stark contrast to the republican
notion of an individual with a specific set of civic obligations, but it also lends
itself to the condemnation of idleness because the logical implication of asserting the total control of one’s own destiny is to place the burden of success
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on the individual alone. The famously popular work of Horatio Alger made
this connection abundantly clear one generation later. Alger’s “rags to riches
stories” are intentionally didactic, presenting a way of life that shaped popular
imagination in the United States after his tales morphed into a form of cultural
currency idolizing the triumph of self-reliant individuals who owe success to no
one else.17 As a result, Alger’s name became synonymous with a radically liberal
brand of individualism that increasingly gained steam in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. Despite its distance from reality, both at Alger’s time
and since, this simple elision of independence and industry in individualism has
been a cultural trope of profound significance in the last 150 years, eclipsing its
republican rival for most of that time.
One major exception to the triumph of the liberal over republican form of
individualism would seem to be the Great Depression, when dire economic
circumstances challenged the myth of total personal control over one’s fate. In
response, communal efforts and government intervention both received widespread support, suggesting the emergence of a more communitarian and less
individualistic ethos. Such an account of the Great Depression and subsequent
New Deal policies proceeds too quickly, though, for the New Deal as actually
enacted evinces the continued persistence of liberal individualism rather than
a republican resurgence. Precisely because the New Deal championed government intervention without reforming the basic structures of the capitalist system, it reinforced the economic freedoms of decidedly liberal individuals, both
presuming and preserving the right of each economic actor to choose what he
or she saw fit while never orienting that personal discretion to some common
project.18 Furthermore, once the Depression faded and economic prosperity
returned, liberal individualism reigned again with explicit force. Consequently,
even if one accepted a victory for republican individualism in the New Deal, this
would merely cede the battle without altering the course of the war.19
This history sets the stage for today, when the liberal species of individualism is far more influential than the republican one. In fact, the individualism
that makes the United States exceptional now is a full-fledged cultural trope
that shapes our public discourse in politics and beyond. Thus, in the 1980s
Robert Bellah and his colleagues identified individualism as the “first language”
of Americans, pointing to a form of “expressive individualism” that encourages individuals to see themselves as set apart from others, pursuing their own
self-defined goals without any need to envision a common project.20 Certainly,
contemporary libertarians epitomize this conviction, but the expressive individualism described by Bellah and colleagues is not restricted to one corner of
public life; instead, it is readily apparent in the commonly accepted claim that
each individual possesses a set of rights that serve as trumps far more than duties, prioritizing nothing more than “the right to be free of others’ demands.”21
The effects of this trend on civic life are hard to overstate, as Americans are

JSCE_37-2_BOOK.indb 121

11/30/17 6:38 PM

122 • Sloth

becoming increasingly less invested in civic projects and in the basic building
blocks of self-governance, eroding social capital and jettisoning the more republican species of individualism.22
For all these reasons, one can legitimately speak of an individualistic ethos
in the United States that presumes the ideas associated with Alger and insists on the self-sufficiency of the liberal individual to the point that he or she
has no obligations to the community except for the ones he or she has freely
chosen to affirm. A few additional nuances are in order. First, this cultural trope
is not reducible to the philosophical interpretation of the individual in political
liberalism. Although they share common roots, the liberal individualism that
colors popular imagination today represents an extreme distortion of political
liberalism’s account of the individual, which would not so readily decouple
freedom and social responsibility.23 Second, the prominence of this species
of individualism does not imply that everyone in the United States subscribes
to this vision of the individual. A host of critics representing a wide variety of
commitments from feminism to communitarianism to conservatism prove that
this is not so.24 Additionally, some religious groups embody a communitarian
spirit that rejects the liberal species of individualism and creates communities
of shared responsibility in its stead.25 Yet, insofar as these alternatives define
themselves in explicit contrast to, or direct retreat from, the broader culture
and its individualism, they use that individualism as a foil and thereby confirm
its prominence as a cultural force.26
Ultimately, the significance of this historical overview lies in the emergence
of liberal individualism as the first language of public discourse today. By setting the terms of the debate, the current ethos of liberal individualism impacts
how people approach contested questions as well as how they think about moral
responsibilities. In this case, the message that each individual is descriptively
capable of ensuring his or her own success is quickly married to the prescriptive
implication that he or she has the obligation to work toward that end. Thus, liberal individualism ostensibly counteracts sloth by encouraging industriousness.
Yet the manner in which this individualist ethos prescribes diligence is inherently problematic, for the idealization of independence masks the realities of
human interdependence, creating a myth of autonomy that falsely shrinks one’s
moral responsibilities. As a result, America’s individualistic ethos may oppose
laziness, but only at the cost of reinforcing sloth. To understand how this is
possible, one must appreciate an essential distinction in the definition of sloth.

The Distinctions of Sloth
The vice of sloth has a complicated history within Christian ethics and popular morality. Christian theologians have associated the vice with a range of
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phenomena, including melancholic sadness, spiritual indifference or sorrow,
laziness or hyperactivity, and moral apathy. This sense of sloth traces its roots
back to the ancient monastic concept of acedia or “lack of care.” Monks like
Evagrius Ponticus saw acedia as a lack of care for God, while others like John
Cassian thought acedia could keep one from productive labor or encourage service as a selfish cure for boredom.27 In short, the classic Christian
conception of sloth is a vice against love (or charity) with a wide range of
manifestations.
Popular morality drops the psychological, spiritual, and moral problems
associated with acedia, and construes sloth more narrowly as the laziness constitutive of a deficient work ethic. The liberal individualist ethos described
above arguably opposes this secularized form of sloth by praising hard work
and industriousness. The problem, however, is that the individualistic ethos
achieves this end by resisting the demands of love, which is a central aspect
of the classic Christian understanding of sloth. In this manner, the liberal
individualist ethos ironically enshrines sloth as a structural vice in contemporary America while ostensibly striving to undermine it as a personal one. To
demonstrate this, it is necessary to consider three sources: Thomas Aquinas,
Max Weber, and Karl Barth.
For Aquinas, sloth is a vice against charity, the chief theological virtue. Charity unites humans to God in a deep bond of friendship and initiates similar
friendships with our neighbors.28 Charity does this by shaping character and
action in a number of respects, three of which are germane to our purposes.
First, charity shapes joy, a habit of rejoicing in the presence of what one loves.29
Joy, then, is a social emotion that is shared with friends. Second, charity helps
one to love God, self, and neighbor in the right order and in the right way. That
is, charity corrects disproportionate and deficient forms of love, such as disinterest in God, excessive self-love, and hatred of others.30 Third, charity makes
one zealous for God and neighbor. A zealous person voluntarily promotes the
good of others and works to remove obstacles or hindrances to their good.31
Together these dispositions inspire the various works of charity, which include
making peace in a divided society, showing mercy, serving others, and sharing
with those in need.32
Sloth opposes charity in each of these respects and fosters a number of
harmful dispositions. As an “oppressive sorrow,” about spiritual good, a slothful person is joyless because he or she perceives the good as evil, and so has
nothing to celebrate.33 A joyless person can become sad and despondent, and
retreat from relationships.
Sloth also disorders love. By mistaking the good for evil, it becomes hard
to love, for nothing is desirable or interesting, not even God, the supreme
good. This does not mean that all slothful people are resigned to total indifference though. Since humans are naturally drawn to the good and seek
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happiness, some slothful people vainly attempt to find total satisfaction in
created things rather than in God.34 The result of this search, however, is
that sloth makes one unhappy, and unhappy people can become spiteful or
malicious rather than loving. One in the grips of spite or malice may engage
in all sorts of combative behaviors and thereby tear the fabric that binds
social relations.
Finally, sloth curbs zeal, for one becomes weary of work and has no interest
in doing good deeds to benefit others.35 Sloth, therefore, fosters sluggishness
or greed for self-gain, both of which can harm or erode relationships.36 For
example, one engrossed in achievement at work may neglect spending time with
one’s partner or children. Importantly, then, hard work can be an expression of
sloth, as it may be motivated by any number of things, including a desire to cure
boredom, dominate others, or acquire goods so that others do not enjoy them.
Aquinas holds that by keeping one from rejoicing in God and the good of
the neighbor, sloth refuses to love and do the works of charity. As a result, sloth
neglects the daily actions that sustain bonds of affection between friends and
other neighbors.37 It is clear that sloth has a number of psychological, spiritual,
and moral effects for Aquinas.
Popular conceptions, on the other hand, equate sloth almost exclusively
with laziness. Max Weber’s “Protestant work ethic” is perhaps the single most
influential account of this view, as it indicates modern industriousness as the
counterpart of sloth. Weber suggests that Calvinism developed the view that
God created humans to glorify God by obeying God’s commandments, one
of which is a command to work.38 Weber’s characterization of this Reformed
conception of sloth has two results.
First, sloth rejects the basic demands of God’s covenant. Weber writes,
“Waste of time is thus the first and in principle the deadliest of sins. . . . Loss of
time through sociability, idle talk, luxury, even more sleep than is necessary for
health . . . is worthy of absolute moral condemnation. . . . [Time] is infinitely
valuable because every hour lost is lost to labour for the glory of God.”39 The
“spirit of capitalism” that emerges from this position affirms the “self-made
man” as its ethical exemplar; this person opposes sloth by working diligently
in response to God’s calling and thereby fulfills the commands to glorify God
and love the neighbor.40 Second, sloth reflects a lack of faith that calls one’s
standing as a member of God’s elect into question. Given God’s transcendence
and inscrutable will, the best way to be assured that one is in fact a member of
God’s elect is by demonstrating faith through work.41 Weber states: “However
useless good works might be as a means of attaining salvation . . . nevertheless,
they are indispensable as a sign of election. . . . In practice this means that God
helps those who help themselves.”42 Hard work, therefore, gives glory to God,
demonstrates faith in God, and avoids the vice of sloth.
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The strength of this Weberian version of the Reformed perspective is that
it takes sloth seriously and devotes substantial theological and ethical attention
to it. The weakness of this view—which Weber acknowledges—is its failure to
grapple with the ways in which hard work can promote an isolated individualism that reflects deficient love of God, self, and neighbor.
This problem is especially clear today in light of the ways in which the liberal
individualist ethos has secularized the concepts of hard work and sloth. Hard
work is no longer the primary means of giving God glory and ensuring one’s
election; rather, it has become a way to secure individual well-being. Enjoying
the fruits of labor is the ultimate incentive to diligence. Those who are slothful,
however, gain nothing and are owed nothing. Lack of industry is their problem,
not failing to obey God. In this way, liberal individualism’s secularizing effects
mirror Weber’s own sense that the “religious roots” of the spirit of capitalism
have “died out,” leaving “sober economic virtue” and “utilitarian worldliness”
in their place.43
This secularization of sloth has the unfortunate consequence of reinforcing
a brand of individualism that refuses the demands of love and relationship.
Karl Barth’s account of sloth demonstrates this connection even more emphatically. Barth views sloth as the human rejection of God’s reconciling grace
that elevates human beings from the effects of sin.44 As such, sloth is a form of
hate that prefers isolated existence apart from the relationships with God and
neighbor that constitute human nature.45 For Barth, then, the characteristic
feature of liberal individualism—namely, the right to be free from the demands
of others46—is actually best seen as the sin of sloth. This is why Barth calls sloth
“graceless being for ourselves.”47
The logic undergirding this connection of sloth and individualism is relatively
straightforward. Human beings were made for fellowship with God and neighbor; by rejecting this fellowship, we curve inward on ourselves and become hostile to the claims of others and their demands on us. Barth likens the slothful
person to a hedgehog who has rolled into a ball with “prickly spikes” that threaten
others.48 This hostility is evident in a range of dispositions and behaviors. Among
other things, slothful individuals are characterized by excessive or deficient selfrespect, by total disinterest in activity or work, by workaholic striving for individual gain, and by disordered relationships with God and neighbor.49
Barth critiques the ideal of “conscientious work” on the grounds that it
refuses to rest in God’s promises and gracious acts.50 In fact, Barth argues
that leisure affirms that God is in control and so is “far superior in dignity” to
workaholism, which promotes self-mastery and self-sufficiency.51 The ethos of
individualism therefore rejects grace because it is free, not earned. Seen in this
light, the workaholism and laziness of sloth are mirror images of one another:
both avoid relationship and obligations to God.
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Moreover, a society composed of slothful individuals experiences a range of
social effects that are highly reminiscent of the structural evils present in our
own day. Barth specifically notes that sloth gives rise to callous indifference,
racism and xenophobia, increasing competitiveness, excessive consumption, the
desire for total security from threats, and a willingness to use violence to achieve
one’s ends.52 For example, if one can expect nothing from one’s neighbors, it is
plausible to construe them as potential enemies that need to be defeated. Foreigners and those of other races are also seen as threatening, so violence, exclusion, and oppression become attractive means to monopolize social benefits and
secure one’s property. Those in the grips of these thoughts often struggle with
anxiety and fear, and so are not free to live an unencumbered life. Barth claims
that each of these social effects stem from sloth’s divestment of relationship in
favor of individualistic existence.
In these respects, Barth expresses a conception of sloth that is similar to
Aquinas’s vice against charity.53 Sloth shapes harmful dispositions in individuals
and can be seen in social structures that promote an individualistic impulse that
rejects God and neighbor.
This brief historical survey allows us to draw two conclusions. First, liberal individualism and sloth reflect an atomistic anthropology that opposes
charity. The individualist ethos seeks protection of individual rights while
limiting social duties and responsibilities. Similarly, sloth curbs love and zeal
and makes us indifferent to relating with and assisting others. In contrast,
Aquinas affirms a social anthropology on which humans were created for
friendship with God and neighbor and so have duties to promote the common good, which secures the well-being of each individual and society as a
whole.54 Charity pursues the common good, while liberal individualism and
sloth refuse this.
Second, the individualist ethos and the vice of sloth are actually product and
producer of one another. Barth argues that individualism and sloth foster social
structures of competition, dominance, exclusion, and harm. These structures
in turn shape individuals who seek self-sufficiency and security on their own
terms and act in ways that sustain harmful structures. Ironically, the ethos of
individualism and hard work ordered to individual gain perpetuates a set of
social circumstances that fracture society and cause sloth.
In summary, sloth rejects relationship and the civic demands of charity,
much like the liberal brand of isolated individualism. Indeed, as this account
of sloth reveals, the values of the reigning form of liberal individualism that
pervades contemporary culture are precisely the values promoted by the vice
of sloth itself. One can rightly indict this cultural trope as a form of sloth, and
this, in effect, makes sloth a peculiarly powerful structural vice in the United
States today. In the final section of our essay, we elaborate on this point,
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specifying the ways in which the ethos of liberal individualism embodies sloth
as a structural vice so that we can then employ this category to propose viable
structural remedies.

Sloth as America’s Structural Vice
While there are a number of terms to identify social structures with negative moral impacts (e.g., structural sin, structural evil, structural violence, and
structural vice), we opt to use “structural vice” because we focus on sloth and
retrieve its classical definition as a capital vice. This language highlights what
is at stake in the case of sloth and the United States’ individualist ethos, which
is first and foremost an impact on dispositions and only then an impact on actions. Naturally, an emphasis on dispositions is consistent with the concept of
virtue, but it also aligns with the more particular notion of a structure of vice
as articulated by Daniel Daly, who argues that “structures of vice are the social
structures that in some way consistently function to prevent the human good,
the common good, and human happiness.”55 Significantly, in identifying the
social structures that might become structures of vice, Daly lists “a value laden
narrative” alongside three other examples.56 Given that the American ethos of
individualism is a value-laden narrative valorizing a form of isolation and selfconcern that amounts to the vice of sloth in its Thomistic and Barthian formulations, it is a structure of vice violating each of Daly’s key areas of assessment.
First, the narrative of liberal individualism suggests that each person is sufficient on his or her own, both generating and supporting a form of sloth that
resists the demands of love by denying the very existence of relationships in the
first place, to say nothing of their responsibilities. This frustrates the human
good, especially as that good is conceived in theological terms, for Christians
argue that the example of Christ shows that the true nature of the human good
lies in kenotic service to others.57 Given this conviction, a cultural ethos that
encourages people to view themselves as closed off from others, like Barth’s
prickly hedgehog, certainly amounts to a structural form of sloth that undermines the human good.
Second, the narrative of liberal individualism also undermines the common
good. By reinforcing the notion that each individual is entirely the master of
his or her own fate, this cultural trope downplays the many ways in which our
well-being depends on shared public goods. A classic example would be the
environment, for the car-centric economy of the United States is designed
around a desire for immediate access to transportation on our own schedules
despite the fact that an excessive reliance on automobiles seriously harms the
environment. In contrast, more collectivist societies in Europe have embraced
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an intentionally sustainable infrastructure built around public transit, which
literally forces individuals to share a common space and schedule.58 Whereas we
have prioritized personal convenience over collective benefit—in keeping with
our individualist ethos—those in collectivist societies have accepted a degree
of individual inconvenience for the sake of a shared benefit; they have put the
common good ahead of private, personal gain. In theory, we might do the same,
but in truth, such personal sacrifices require an awareness of one’s place within
a broader community. Sadly, this connection is exactly what the slothful narrative of liberal individualism masks. By promoting self-love and corrupting the
order of charity, this structural vice leaves the individual focused on maximizing
personal gain regardless of social costs, a process that undermines the common
good not only by facilitating the destruction of public goods but also by eroding
participation in communal life more generally.
Finally, the cultural trope of liberal individualism frustrates human happiness as well. By suggesting a moral obligation to ensure one’s own success
exclusively, the narrative of liberal individualism values relationships in solely
utilitarian terms. This slothful rejection of charity harms the human happiness
of those who are used for utilitarian ends, since their personal needs are subordinated to an agent’s self-interested aims. Just as importantly, this form of sloth
harms the human happiness of the agent as well. The basis for this claim lies
in empirical work, primarily in psychology and economics, which has demonstrated that human happiness is most powerfully affected by “relational goods,”
not by financial or other material goods. Relational goods are the benefits that
arise from relationships and other social connections, and, significantly, the
strongest of these benefits are tied to “non-instrumental social interaction.”59
There is also a theological parallel for this observation, as the relational anthropology of a human being made in the image and likeness of the Holy Trinity
suggests a natural affinity (and thus eudaimonistic fittingness) for relationships,
especially relationships in which the inherent distinctiveness of each party is
affirmed for its own sake.60 In both empirical and theological terms, then, the
slothfulness of our liberal individualist ethos frustrates human happiness.
The narrative of liberal individualism is laden with the values of the vice of
sloth, and through those values this narrative “function[s] to prevent the human
good, the common good, and human happiness.”61 As such, we are confident in
our diagnosis of liberal individualism—and, by association, sloth—as a structural vice. This diagnosis provides a useful basis for constructing a solution
because the twofold description of the individualist ethos as a structure and a
vice indicates that the problem will best be countered by structures that promote opposing virtues. Although there are a number of structures that could
be well suited to this task, church communities are especially valuable since
moral formation is a central part of their mission. Given what has been said
above about religious communities’ existing efforts to create alternatives to
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America’s unique individualist ethos, the way churches go about this task will
be particularly important. If the structures of vice in American society are going
to be transformed, churches will need to promote their alternative visions as
reforms within rather than retreats from the broader culture of individualism.
Furthermore, these communities will need to harness their power as agents
of collective action, providing the structural supports to encourage personal
formation not just in virtue generally but also in the specific virtues that can
oppose sloth in its structural forms. While the well-documented rise of the
“Nones” suggests that religious communities will face an uphill battle in this
project, churches that embrace their structural role might actually appeal to the
large portion of the unaffiliated that still openly longs for community, thereby
extending the reach of the alternative vision.62 At the same time, the effects of
a church’s structural reforms should expand beyond its members anyway, so the
success of this project does not hinge exclusively on religious affiliation. Given
the importance of this task and the real opposition it will face, we would like
to close by proposing two essential virtues for this type of structural reform.63
Since sloth is, in the classical formulation retrieved here, a vice against charity, charity itself offers a helpful corrective to sloth’s structural instantiations
because this virtue can be used to establish a counternarrative and an alternative structure to effects of liberal individualism. First, charity directly addresses
the myth of self-sufficiency by reminding us that “We love because God first
loved us” (1 John 4:19). In the words of Pope Benedict XVI, “Charity in truth
places [us] before the astonishing experience of gift,” and “because it is a gift
received by everyone, charity in truth is a force that builds community,” bringing people together with a shared narrative of inherent interdependence.64
Second, charity also directs the individual away from exclusive self-concern by
introducing a proper ordering of love that necessarily acknowledges not only
God but also the neighbor whom God also loves.65 As Eric Gregory has artfully
demonstrated, this understanding of charity is not some parochial tool exclusive
to Christians but a helpful category for the revitalization of civic commitment
in a pluralistic context and thus a corrective to the isolated individualism of our
preferred cultural trope and peculiar structural vice.66 Finally, charity is oriented to structural reform. Martin Luther King Jr. made this abundantly clear
sixty years ago when he spoke of “the beloved community” as the end game of
the civil rights movement, suggesting that it was the love of God, agape, that
would inform the restoration of a just and equitable society.67 Significantly,
King also argued that this love directs our attention to “the unjust system,
rather than the individuals who are caught in that system.”68 With this claim,
King points toward charity as a structural virtue capable of motivating actions
targeted at systemic change without turning anyone into an enemy. In all three
of these ways, then, charity indicts the divisive narrative of absolute autonomy
and exclusive self-concern that turned sloth into America’s ironic structural vice
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while simultaneously creating the dispositions for a renewed sense of shared
commitment and mutual concern in civic life.
Beyond the restoration of charity, another promising project is recovering
the virtue of solidarity and the ethos of the common good. John Paul II affirms
that solidarity “is not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the
misfortunes” of others but “a firm and persevering determination to commit
oneself to the common good.”69 Solidarity, then, is a virtuous disposition that
recognizes human interdependence and seeks the well-being of each person
and society as a whole. Churches and social groups that promote solidarity and
the common good will provide additional correctives to the selfish and isolationist tendencies of sloth and liberal individualism by advocating for justice
and peace.70 Interestingly, liberal individualism arose in part as a response to
the common good tradition, which came to be seen as a tyrannical imposition
of a single vision of the good life on a pluralistic society.71 Nevertheless, there
are ways to promote the common good that are pluralistic and integrationist,
not monolithic and authoritarian. For example, Rabbi Jonathan Sacks argues
against cultural paternalism, where all must assimilate to the dominant culture,
and liberal multiculturalism, where there is dignity in difference but everyone
ought to be left alone, and instead affirms the goal of establishing the common good though collaborative service projects.72 By working together, Sacks
contends that individuals and social groups can retain their distinct identities
while forging common bonds and nurturing relationships. Such collaboration
also develops dispositions of civil deliberation and charitable interpretation,
which can sustain dialogue that reveals common ground.73 Thus, the ethos
of the common good fosters just dealings between persons, inspires institutions and communities of social action that promote shared benefits, and strives
for the just distribution of these benefits so that everyone in society enjoys
them.74 Consequently, a society ordered to the common good is characterized
by friendship and the virtue of solidarity rather than suspicion, conflict, and the
desire to be free from responsibilities.
By renewing charity and solidarity and by nurturing a commitment to the
common good, religious communities and other structures can counteract the
various harms associated with sloth and liberal individualism. It follows that
the structural defense of love and service of God and others—not hard work
ordered to individual gain—are the true remedies of the structural vice of sloth.
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